This time BAA Training team presents video about dual hydraulic failure in Airbus A320. Let’s find out how it went for Martynas and Yufei! To make it more interesting, we challenge you once again! Name all the mistakes that our team made, and the one with the closest answer will get our prize! You have two weeks for that! Do not forget – this video is not for training purposes!

BAA Training headquarters is in Lithuania and counts more than 20 years of experience in aviation training, while its heritage reaches 1938 – the establishment of the Lithuanian airlines training department. In addition to training base in headquters it is able to offer training solutions in various Europe, CIS and Asia locations.

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  1. If you are a Flight simulator gamer is ok. If you are a professional pilot don't follow this video please. Thank you guys. I appreciate your intentions but real life require real training.

  2. It's just playtime obviously. There is no instructor and it's not a training slot. The guy in the right seat is not even in training on the A320. Lighten up with the OCD Jesus! They are just playing.

  3. 1:15 Is it fart? Or maybe its a fly? Or maybe wasp? Bee?
    Farts are flammable, flies are f**** annoying and wasps may sting a neck and kill both pilots this way (they can sting multiple times unlike bees).

  4. btw these are not all the mistakes
    the main mistake of the crew was that always during a flight 1 pilot should control the flight and the communication while the other should perform the ECAM checklist and in this case these rules were not followed
    2)the LOC and G/S cannot be captured if the autopilot is not operational
    3)no chronometer was set during the takeoff roll
    4)pressed autobreak button when its INOP

  5. The ECAM procedure was not followed as per Airbus SOP. The ECAM was not stopped to check for normal checklist, any computer reset, QRH procedure. The status was not read. The Flap setting was not as per SOP, the speed needs to be checked first the the flap is to be set and setting to be called after seeing the SD page. The normal checklist were not done. Both the pilots were looking inside. PF was also entering data in MCDU. PM should have been doing all the MCDU entries, ECAM actions.

  6. 1- no seatbelts used
    2- no chrono for take off with TOGA
    3- when gear up, nose gear lights must be turned to OFF
    4- no oredered Ecam Actions
    5- At status: check C/B, check OEB, After T/O climb checklist
    6- Land asap red : it's a MAY DAY
    7- lack of preparation of the approach (no MCDU neither QRH in flight performance part)
    8- no approach briefing (asking for MED Auto/BRK after reading it as inop)
    9- no approach chart to check the descent and the final approach profile
    10- no minimums (MDA) insertion
    11- since Auto/Thrust is Auto, you must manage speed on the final segment of the approach to allow the Ground speed mini function to work in case of needed

    *by the way, good touchdown!
    you'll improve with time 😉

  7. 1. No chrono started on take off
    2. No half stick down on take off, until 80 knots and then progressively reduce the deflection to reach neutral at 100 knots; to counteract for the nose-up effect of setting engine take off thrust thus improving aircraft performance
    3. No "Engines stable" callout on take off. If there was a difference of more than 1% of N1 between the engines, it should be entered in the logbook after flight
    4. Squawking 7700 on take off, when the hydraulic failure hasn't occurred yet
    5. 2:43 UTC time on SD not synchronized with the cockpit clock thus showing amber XX
    6. Violating Airbus third operational golden rule: One head up at all times
    7. Clear SD (System display, Lower ECAM), throught the whole flight On 3:07, we can see an overflow sybmol which indicates there are more messages to be read, but because no one cleared it that messages weren't displayed to the flight crew until very the last end
    8. No minimums entered
    9. 7:00 Landing gear gravity extension wasn't done correctly. You should first pull and turn the handcrank 3 times clockwise and then select the gear down
    10. On touchdown nobody said "Spoilers up". Spoilers number 3 on each wing were fully operational, and armed upon landing.
    11. You didn't follow the APPR PROC on SD, if hydraulic system is lost by RSVR LO AIR PR the related pump (on approach) should be selected on and PTU to AUTO position. In most cases the hydraulic is RECOVERABLE.
    12. You have first extended the gear and then stabilized on VAPP, which is unfortunately wrong. FCOM 3.02.29 P11, Extending the gear after you have stabilized at VAPP enables the aircraft to be trimmed for the approach
    13. Landing distance procedure was never applied. It calls to multiply your LDG DIST for 2.3 times due to the increased approach speed, loss of antiskid and reversers 1+2 and partial loss of ground spoilers.
    14. 1:50 PF never reads ECAM procedures. PNF is responsible for ECAM/checklist reading and executing various commands on PF request.
    15. No consulting with QRH or any kind of manual. Many of these mistakes could then be avoided.
    16. No cabin crew notifying
    17. No ATC
    18. No Brace for impact for passengers. It's neccesery to do that because there is grave danger of overshotting or skidding the runway.
    19. No passengers were informed about the emergency on board
    20. No takeoff/approach/landing checklist
    21. Violating Airbus second operational golden rule: Fly, navigate, communicate – in that order
    22. 7:10 Clear E/WD(direct law warning), consequence: no LDG MEMO.
    23. ECAM Actions were never said, you just started to read from ECAM, and what's worse PF started to read ECAM not PNF.
    24. You should say "speedcheck" BEFORE selecting flaps